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I. INTRODUCTION
As we enter the post baby-boom era, we find that the American
population as a whole is older than ever before. The increasing percentage
of middle-aged and elderly individuals in our society has resulted in a
growing perception that social security will not adequately be able to
meet the retirement needs of the public. One result of this concern has
been a proliferation of public and private pension plans More and more,
Americans are turning to pension plans to ensure their financial security
upon retirement.
Pension plans are typically established through collective bargaining
agreements. Disputes frequently arise concerning the creation and op-
eration of these plans. These disputes can have a tremendous impact
upon both retired employees already receiving benefits and working
employees who anticipate receiving benefits.
The Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)' was Con-
gress' first attempt to regulate pension plans in a comprehensive manner.
One of the paramount purposes of ERISA is to ensure that employees
and their beneficiaries are not deprived of vested pension plan benefits
because of employer withdrawal or employer refusal to contribute. 2
Under the auspices of ERISA, the congressionally-created Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) acts as an insurer for single and
multiemployer pension plans, protecting covered employees against plan
failures.3 This insurance is maintained by per capita assessments against
each covered plan. Under this insurance plan, PBGC pays pension fund
participants the amount to which they are entitled under their employee
fund.4 PBGC then recovers its expended funds by levying against the
employer for such amounts paid by PBGC, not to exceed 30% of the
employer's het worth.5 While PBGC has been insuring all single employer
pension funds since the enactment of ERISA, this coverage was not
extended to multiemployer funds until 1978.6
In 1977, Congress instructed PBGC to examine the impact and the
implications of employer withdrawal from multiemployer pension plans.7
The study, which PBGC issued on July 1, 1978, predicted that future
maintenance of the program would require assessments against individual
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
2. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1980).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1302.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b),(c).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b)(2).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1381(c).
7. Pub. L. No. 95-214, 91 Stat. 1501 (1977).
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pension plans to be increased nearly 2000% within a few short years.
The primary reason for this predicted rise in pension plan failures was
the increasing number of employer withdrawals from multiemployer
plans. PBGC would be forced to incur ever-increasing liability.
The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA)
was enacted by Congress in response to the problem of employer
withdrawal from multiemployer pension plans. In enacting MPPAA,
Congress expressly authorized arbitrators under the Act to determine
the statutory liability of employer-respondents. 9 In a manner similar to
administrative determinations, MPPAA empowers arbitrators to establish
the liability of disputants, subject to judicial review. Hence, MPPAA
extends arbitrator authority into a non-traditional area in order to
facilitate resolution of disputes.
This Article examines MPPAA's attempt to deal with employer
withdrawal from multiemployer pension funds. First, the provisions of
the Act are explained. Next, the evolution of statutory liability arbitration
is examined. Third, the role of judicial review in this scheme is discussed.
Finally, statutory and constitutional challenges to MPPAA liability
arbitration are examined.
II. THE MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLAN AMENDMENTS AcT
The most significant aspect of MPPAA is that the Act imposes
"withdrawal liability" upon employers who permanently withdraw from
multiemployer pension plans.'0 An employer is held liable for damages
in an amount equal to the share of unfunded vested benefits" which
have accrued under the plan.' 2 The Act dictates that a third party, the
pension plan sponsor, be appointed in accordance with the agreement
between the employer and employees. The plan sponsor determines
whether or not the employer has violated the Act. If the employer is
found liable, the plan sponsor will calculate the amount of damages for
which a withdrawing employer is liable. 3 Finally, the plan sponsor must
notify the employer of its liability and establish a schedule of payments.' 4
Any dispute raised by the employer over the determinations made by
the plan sponsor must be submitted to an arbitrator,' 5 who is chosen
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1461 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1401, infra note 15.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1381.
11. These are benefits which, though they have vested in the employee, are unsupported
by sufficient resources in the pension fund.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1391.
13. Id.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(1). If the withdrawing employer fails to comply, the pension
plan sponsor may then demand immediate payment of the entire withdrawal liability
incurred. 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(5).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1401.
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1401. Resolution of disputes.
(a) Arbitration proceedings; matters subject to arbitration, procedures applicable,
etc. (1) Any dispute between an employer and the plan sponsor of a multiemployer
plan concerning a determination made under sections 4201 through 4219 [29 U.S.C.
§§ 1381 - 1389] shall be resolved through arbitration. Either party may initiate the
arbitration proceeding within a 60-day period after the earlier of-
(A) the date of notification to the employer under section 4219(b)(2)(B) [29
U.S.C. § 1399(b)(2)(B)], or
(B) 120 days after the date of the employer's request under section 4219(b)(2)(A)
[29 U.S.C.S. § 1399(b)(2)(A)].
The parties may jointly initiate arbitration within the 180-day period after the date
of the plan sponsor's demand under section 4219(b)(1) [29 U.S.C.S. § 1399(b)(1)].
(2) An arbitration proceeding under this section shall be conducted in accordance
with fair and equitable procedures to be promulgated by the corporation [PBGC].
The plan sponsor may purchase insurance to cover potential liability of the arbitrator.
If the parties have not provided for the costs of the arbitration, including arbitrator's
fees, by agreement, the arbitrator shall assess such fees. The arbitrator may also
award reasonable attorney's fees.
(3)(A) For purposes of any proceeding under this section, any determination made
by a plan sponsor under sections 4201 through 4219 and section 4225 [29 U.S.C.S.
§§ 1381 - 1399 and 1405] is presumed correct unless the party contesting the
determination shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the determination was
unreasonable or clearly erroneous.
(B) In the case of the determination of a plan's unfunded vested benefits for
a plan year, the determination is presumed correct unless a party contesting
the determination shows by a preponderance of evidence that -
(i) the actuarial assumptions and methods used in the determination were,
in the aggregate, unreasonable (taking into account the experience of the
plan and reasonable expectations), or
(ii) the plan's actuary made a significant error in applying the actuarial
assumption or methods.
(b) Alternative collection proceedings; civil action subsequent to arbitration award;
conduct of arbitration proceedings. (1) If no arbitration proceeding has been initiated
pursuant to subsection (a), the amounts demanded by the plan sponsor under section
4219(b)(1) [29 U.S.C.S. § 1399(b)(1)] shall be due and owing on the schedule set
forth by the plan sponsor. The plan sponsor may bring an action in a State or
Federal court of competent jurisdiction for collection.
(2) Upon completion of the arbitration proceedings in favor of one of the parties,
any party thereto may bring an action, no later than 30 days after the issuance of
the arbitrator's award, in an appropriate United States district court in accordance
with section 4301 [29 U.S.C.S. § 1451] to enforce, vacate, or modify the arbitrator's
award.
(3) Any arbitration proceeding under this section shall, to the extent consistent with
this title, be conducted in the same manner, subject to the same limitations, carried
out with the same powers (including subpena [sic] power), and enforced in the
United States courts as an arbitration proceeding carried out under Title 9, United
States Code [9 U.S.C.S. § 1 et seq.].
(c) Presumption respecting findings of fact by arbitrator. In any proceeding under
subsection (b), there shall be a presumption, rebuttable only by a clear preponderance
of the evidence, that the findings of fact made by the arbitrator were correct.
(d) Payments by employer prior and subsequent to determination by arbitrator,
adjustments; failure of employer to make payments. Payments shall be made by
the employer in accordance with the determinations made under this part until the
arbitrator issues a final decision with respect to the determination submitted for
arbitration, with any necessary adjustments in subsequent payments for overpayments
or underpayments arising out of the decision of the arbitrator with respect to the
determination. If the employer fails to make timely payment in accordance with
such final decision, the employer shall be treated as being delinquent in the making
of a contribution required under the plan (within the meaning of section 515) [29
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in accordance with the employer-employee agreement or the pension
trust document. If the parties fail to initiate MPPAA arbitration, the
determination of the plan sponsor becomes final. The plan sponsor may
then, if necessary, bring an action in any competent state or federal
court enforcing collection of the damages owed by the employer. 6
Either the plan sponsor or the withdrawing employer may initiate
arbitration within a 60 day period after the notification of liability, or
within 120 days after an employer's request for a liability determination.
Another possibility is that the parties may jointly initiate arbitration
within 180 days after the pension plan sponsor's notification of liability
and demand for payment from the employer.' 7 An arbitration hearing
is then conducted in accordance with fair and equitable procedures as
promulgated by PBGC, s or, if no procedures are promulgated, by any
reasonable procedures agreed to by the parties.' 9 The arbitrator will
assess fees, including reasonable attorneys fees, unless the parties agree
otherwise. 20 The pension plan sponsor is entitled to purchase insurance
to cover the costs of arbitration.
The pension plan sponsor is required to provide the withdrawing party
with information reasonably necessary for the employer to compute its
own liability in order to challenge the plan sponsor's computation. 2'
Either party may further challenge the arbitrator's determination in a
court of law. However, a statutory presumption of arbitral accuracy
exists, and, upon review, the findings of fact by the arbitrator may be
rebutted only by a clear preponderance of the evidence.
During the time period prior to a decision by the arbitrator, the
withdrawing employer is liable in accordance with the determination
made by the pension plan sponsor.22 The arbitrator's award will make
U.S.C.S. § 1145].
(e) Furnishing of information by plan sponsor to employer respecting computation
of withdrawal liability of employer; fees. If any employer requests in writing that
the plan sponsor make available to the employer general information necessary for
the employer to compute its withdrawal liability with respect to the plan (other
than information which is unique to that employer), the plan sponsor shall furnish
the information to the employer without charge. If any employer requests in writing
that the plan sponsor make an estimate of such employer's potential withdrawal
liability with respect to the plan or to provide information unique to that employer,
the plan sponsor may require the employer to pay the reasonable cost of making
such estimate or providing such information.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(l), supra note 15.
17. U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1), supra note 15.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2), supra note 15. See also PBGC Opinion Letter 82-32
(1982) (In the absence of PBGC guidelines, arbitration of withdrawal liability may be
conducted under any reasonable procedures the parties may select).
19. Presumptions which are established by § 1401(a)(3), supra note 15, control the
substantive process of arbitration while regulations which PBGC is yet to enact would
control the process procedurally.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2), supra note 15.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(e), supra note 15.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(d), supra note 15.
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necessary adjustments reflecting any underpayments or overpayments. 23
A withdrawing employer who fails to make the requisite payments is
considered delinquent and will suffer the resulting consequences. 24
III. STATUTORY LIABILITY ARBITRATION
Arbitration traditionally has been confined to two types: grievance
arbitration and interest arbitration.25 Grievance arbitration generally
seeks to resolve disputes over interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements without resort to litigation or economic weapons. Interest
arbitration operates mainly as a substitute for collective bargaining. 26
Now, however, the enactment of MPPAA establishes a separate category
of arbitration, called "statutory liability arbitration." Statutory liability
arbitration is a congressionally imposed adjudicatory procedure. In this
scheme, the arbitrator is placed in a position similar to that of a
bureaucratic administrator for the purpose of determining employer
withdrawal liability.27
Though the arbitrator is in a position similar to an agency admin-
istrator, there is no de novo review of the issues. Instead, the arbitrator's
purview is circumscribed by rebuttable presumptions established under
the Act. The MPPAA arbitrator functions more like a reviewing court
than an agency administrator acting upon a dispute of first impression.
Hence, the arbitrator's position is one of compromise. Arbitration pro-
vides a service which could have been assigned to an administrative
agency. An arbitrator differs, however, from a bureaucratic administrator
in that his functions are limited in the same way that a reviewing court
is limited.
MPPAA restricts the arbitrator's authority in three ways. First, the
Act establishes two presumptions:
(a) The determination of the pension plan sponsor will be upheld unless
shown to be unreasonable or clearly erroneous;" and,
(b) With regard to the pension plan sponsor's determination of the plan's
unfunded vested benefits for any plan year, actuarial assumptions and
23. Id.
24. Id. The penalties incurred by such deliquency may be established by the collective
bargaining agreement, the trust agreement or the statute. Under the statute, delinquency
in contributions violates 29 U.S.C. § 1145. Civil action may thereafter be brought pursuant
to 29 U.S.C. § 1132 for accounting, audit expenses, damages, interest and/or injunctive
relief.
25. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (3d ed.
1973).
26. Smith, Arbitration and the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments: From the
Golden Age to Age of Reason, 12 CAP. U. L. REv. 17 (1982).
27. But unlike a court, the arbitrator is limited by the presumptions established by
§ 1401(a)(3) of the Act, supra note 15.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3)(A), supra note 15.
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methods are upheld unless the calculation is shown to be unreasonable
in the aggregate or unless the actuary is shown to have made a
significant error in applying those assumptions or methods. 29
Second, as mentioned previously, the Act empowers PBGC to promulgate
procedures under which an MPPAA arbitration must be conducted. To
date, however, PBGC has failed to promulgate any such regulations.
Third, because an employer receives the information to challenge damage
calculations and liability charges from the plan sponsor,30 the only
question for arbitration is whether the plan sponsor or the employer
drew the correct conclusions from the uncontested substantive infor-
mation. These restrictions further limit an arbitrator's decision-making
authority.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF STATUTORY LIABILITY ARBITRATION
Statutory liability arbitration is a logical extension of the use of
dispute resolution techniques in our increasingly complex society.', This
method of dispute resolution is judicially approved. Case law32 authorizes
arbitration when the interests involved are created statutorily or through
a collective bargaining agreement.33
Nonetheless, prior case law did not envision the broad type of
administrative/adjudicatory arbitration established under MPPAA. Those
cases found that because such arbitration would effectively supplant
either an administrative agency or a judicial determination in the first
instance, procedural safeguards were required.
The two leading Supreme Court cases which limited the scope and
depth of arbitrator authority are Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 34
and Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.3 5 Both cases
involved determination of the degree of deference to which labor ar-
bitrators acting under collective bargaining agreements are entitled. Both
cases held that claims arising out of violations of federal statutes can
be immediately adjudicated in federal courts, notwithstanding any ar-
bitration clause to the contrary.36 Further, if a dispute had already been
arbitrated, a reviewing court was under no obligation whatsoever to
defer to the arbitrator's findings.37 In Alexander, the Supreme Court
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3)(B), supra note 15.
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 1401(e), supra note 15.
31. Smith, supra, at 17.
32. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Barrentine v. Arkansas-
Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
33. Smith, supra, at 17, 20 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
49-50 (1974) and Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981)).
34. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
35. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
36. See Smith, supra, at 26.
37. Id.
174
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reasoned that a fact-finding forum could not have binding authority
without some type of judicial record.38 Barrentine reaffirmed that the
function of a labor arbitrator is merely to consider liability issues.
These two Supreme Court cases seem to indicate that statutory
liability arbitration can never bind the parties. However, MPPAA es-
tablishes a binding form of statutory liability arbitration which withstands
most challenges. MPPAA's expanded use of arbitration undoubtedly
portends an expanded use of arbitration in other legal areas as well.
V. STATUTORY LIABILITY ARBITRATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
MPPAA presumes that the arbitrator's factual determinations are
correct. This presumption is rebuttable upon a showing of clear pre-
ponderance of the evidence.39 To this extent, the role of a court reviewing
MPPAA arbitration determinations is analogous to judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA instructs a reviewing
court to strike down agency factual determinations only when "unsup-
ported by substantial evidence. '40 Both the MPPAA and the APA allow
a non-judicial third party to decide statutory liability questions with
only limited judicial review.
In the context of administrative law, one justification for the limited
judicial review is that administrative agencies are statutorily presumed
to have expertise in their respective fields.4' This justification does not
apply to MPPAA arbitrators, however, since the MPPAA does not
require its arbitrators to be experts in the field. Indeed, the Act does
not provide any procedural or substantive guidelines for choosing an
arbitrator; rather, this is left to the discretion of the parties.42 Courts
must thus defer to MPPAA arbitrators even though the arbitrators may
have no expertise. However, this lack of a statutory expertise requirement
may have little or no practical effect on the validity of arbitral deter-
minations because it is unlikely that business executives and pension
plan administrators would choose an ignorant or inexperienced arbitrator.
38. Smith, supra, at 21. No record is required under MPPAA."
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(c), supra note 15.
40. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1980). Similarly, the Uniform Law Commissioners' Revised
Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1961) authorizes the reviewing court to strike
down an administrative factual determination only if it is "clearly erroneous in view of
the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record." (emphasis added)
§ 15(g)(5).
41. See generally, Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLOM. L. REV. 1 (1975); Note, Jurisdiction
to Review Federal Administrative Action: District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 HARv.
L. REv. 980 (1975).
42. Supra note 15.
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VI. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
A. Interpretation of Statutory Provisions
The language of the MPPAA is broad. Section 1401(a) of the Act
states that "[a]ny dispute between an employer and the plan sponsor"
concerning a withdrawal liability determination is relegated to arbitra-
tion.43 However, the courts have concluded that a literal application of
this broad language was never Congress' intent. Rather, the courts have
found that statutory liability arbitration is limited to the narrow question
of whether or not an employer wrongfully withdrew from a fund; MPPAA
arbitration does not displace the role of the judiciary as the interpreter
of statutory language.
For example, in Refined Sugars, Inc. v. Local 807 Labor-Management
Pension Fund,44 the only question raised by the plaintiff corporation in
an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief was whether
the corporation was an employer as defined by the Act.45 The corporation
contended that, because only an employer is required to arbitrate under
Section 1401(a), defining the term "employer" for purposes of the Act
is a necessary precedent to the requisite arbitration procedures. 46 Relying
upon the Supreme Court case of McKart v. United States, 47 the district
court found that issues involving statutory interpretation need not be
followed. 48 The court stated that
[n]either an arbitrator nor the trustees of a pension are authorized to interpret or
construe a federal statute. The interpretation of a federal statute is a matter reserved
for the federal courts. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Assn., 442 F.2d 251,
255 (8th Cir. 1971) .... [Here] liability vel non is initially dependent upon the
interpretation of the term .... Inasmuch as an arbitrator could not interpret [the
statute], a request for arbitration . . . would serve no useful purpose. 49
The court limited the scope of arbitrator authority under MPPAA to
issues involving
whether an employer has totally, partially or not withdrawn from a plan and what
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a), supra note 15.
44. 580 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
45. Defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5).
46. The court noted that although "exhaustion" was not precisely the correct term,
courts interpreting MPPAA have generally held the exhaustion doctrine applicable. 580
F. Supp. 1457, 1459 citing Republic Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council, 718 F.2d
628 (4th Cir. 1983) and Republic Indus., Inc. v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters, 693
F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1982).
47. 395 U.S. 185, 197-98 (1969).
48. Refined Sugars, Inc. v. Local 807 Labor-Management Pension Fund, 580 F. Supp.
1457, 1461 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Meatcutters Local 88 Pension Plan v. Del Monte
Supermarkets, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mo. 1983)).
49. Id., (citing Meatcutters Local 88 Pension Plan v. Del Monte Supermarkets, Inc.,
565 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mo. 1983)).
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the amount, if any, its consequent liability should be. These determinations are
made by reference to and by interpretation of the Act, which has detailed provisions
as to when withdrawal has occurred, whether such withdrawal is total or partial,
whether the employer is liable for payment of withdrawal liability after a withdrawal
has taken place and how that liability is to be computed. °
Though no clear consensus on the role of the judiciary under MPPAA
has been reached, Refined Sugars, Inc. represents the majority view.
In T.LM.E.-D.C., Inc. v. Trucking Employees of North Jersey Welfare
Fund,5' a New York district court held that interpretation of the term
"labor dispute," as used in the MPPAA,52 must be left to the courts,
not the arbitrators. Similarly, in Meatcutters Local Pension Plan v. Del
Monte Supermarkets, Inc.,5 a Missouri district court found that the
term "facilities," as used in the Act, was to be defined by the courts,
not through an arbitration proceeding.
However, in Williamson Shaft Contracting Co. v. United Mine Work-
ers 1974 Pension Plan,54 a Pennsylvania district court allowed the
MPPAA arbitrator to interpret the term "facility," because there was
no showing of irreparable injury. The court relied on Republic Industries,
Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 of Virginia Pension Fund,5 in
finding that the MPPAA arbitration scheme was "elaborate and calls
for findings of fact by the arbitration as a basis for later judicial
review. ' 56 The court expressly rejected Refined Sugars, Inc., however,
reasoning that "[questions] of statutory interpretation do not require
any particular expertise which is the usual distinguishing characteristic
in the administrative process. '57 The court's reliance on Republic In-
dustries, Inc. may be somewhat misplaced, in that Republic Industries,
Inc. primarily dealt with constitutional challenges to MPPAA's arbitra-
tion procedure; the question of statutory interpretation was ancillary at
best. The petitioners in Republic argued that judicial review of arbitral
interpretation violated due process because review would be meaning-
less.58 It was within this narrow context that the Fourth Circuit suggested
50. Id., (citing Baldwin v. Shopmen's Ironworkers Pension Trust, 3 Employee Benefits
Cases ("EBC") 1713, 1716 (C.D. Cal. 1982)).
51. 560 F. Supp. 294 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1398(2).
53. 565 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mo. 1983). See also I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund v. Schulze
Tool and Die Co., 564 F. Supp. 1285 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
54. 585 F. Supp. 633 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
55. 718 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984). In the instant
case the issue of whether two trucking terminals were separate "facilities" and whether
one had been closed down prior to MPPAA enactment were found to be mixed questions
of law and fact appropriate for an arbitrator.
56. Williamson Shaft Contracting Co. v. United Mine Workers 1974 Pension Plan,
585 F. Supp. 633, 635 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
57. Id. at 634.
58. Republic Industries, Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 of Virginia Pension
Fund, 718 F.2d 628, 639 (4th Cir. 1983).
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that MPPAA arbitration is an appropriate forum for statutory definitional
questions.
In addition, the court in Williamson seems to have perceived the
petitioner as trying to avoid the obligations altogether. Petitioner did
not bring this action until the arbitration proceeding was well underway.
The arbitration involved many interrelated questions, only one of which
involved statutory interpretation. Despite this, petitioners sought to stay
the entire arbitration proceeding, rather than seeking a declaratory
judgment as to the arbitrator's authority. The court stressed that staying
arbitration would violate equitable principles and impede judicial economy.
B. Constitutional Challenges
1. Right to a Jury Trial
The arbitration provisions of MPPAA have been challenged on seventh
amendment grounds in five circuits. In each instance, MPPAA proce-
dural requirements withstood the seventh amendment challenge.
In Terson Co., Inc. v. Bakery Drivers and Salesmen Local 194
59
the Third Circuit held that the seventh amendment right to a jury trial
is not violated when a statute establishes a particularized tribunal to
perform a specialized adjudicatory function, so long as the statute further
provides for judicial review. 60 Under MPPAA, the particularized tribunal
is the section 1401 arbitrator. The Second Circuit found that MPPAA
provides for full and fair judicial review despite statutorily imposed
presumptions favoring arbitral findings. In Textile Workers Pension
Fund v. Standard Dye and Finishing Co., 61 the Second Circuit further
determined that the elaborate procedures established under MPPAA,
including the use of a specialized tribunal, are constitutionally sound
even though issues of fact are not decided by a jury.62
In Republic Industries, Inc.,6 3 the Fourth Circuit rejected the same
constitutional challenge. Relying upon the 1977 Supreme Court decision
of Atlas Roofing Co. v. O.S.H.A., 64 the Fourth Circuit held that in
civil actions, the seventh amendment right to a jury trial applies only
to common law causes of action between private parties. The court
noted that this case involved the interests of a non-private party, the
PBGC, which it described as "a public body representing the public
interest. '65 The court stated the longstanding rule that "Congress may
59. 739 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1984).
60. Id. at 121.
61. 725 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1984).
62. Id. at 854-55. Under the Act, facts are determined by the arbitrator in accordance
with the presumptive strictures established in § 1401(a)(3).
63. 718 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1983).
64. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
65. Republic Industries, Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 of Virginia Pension
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constitutionally enact a statutory remedy unknown at common law,
vesting fact finding in an administrative agency or others without the
need for a jury trial. '66
The Seventh Circuit, in Peick v. Pensions Benefits Guaranty Corp.,67
similarly relied upon Atlas Roofing Co. in rejecting a seventh amendment
challenge to MPPAA. "Liability under the MPPAA is not a contractually
or privately created burden, rather it is imposed by law and its benefits
eventually inure to all beneficiaries of multiemployer plans." 68 Therefore,
the court found that vesting the function of fact finding in an arbitrator
does not violate the seventh amendment.
The D.C. Circuit reached the same result in Washington Star Co.
v. International Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan,69 citing
Republic Industries, Inc., Textile Workers Pension Fund, and Atlas
Roofing Co.
2. Due Process Challenges
MPPAA's retroactive arbitration provisions have faced numerous due
process challenges. The Supreme Court in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co.,70 affirmed that retroactive civil legislation may be legiti-
mately enacted. Usery held that the test for determining whether a
retroactive civil statute is legitimate is one of rationality.7' The Court
in Usery, however, did not articulate any specific test for determining
rationality.
The most often used test for determining rationality was first artic-
ulated in Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefits Guaranty Corp. :72
Rationality must be determined by a comparison of the problem to be remedied
with the nature and the scope of the burden imposed to remedy the problem. In
evaluating the nature and scope of the burden, it is appropriate to consider the
reliance interests of the parties affected .... whether the impairment of the private
interest is in an area previously subjected to regulatory control, . . . and the
inclusion of statutory provisions designed to limit and moderate the impact of the
burden.7
Thus, the Nachman test involves a balancing of four factors: (1) the
reliance interests of the parties; (2) whether the impairment of the
private interest is in an area previously subject to regulatory control;
(3) the equities of imposing legislative burdens; and (4) the inclusion
Fund, 718 F.2d 628, 642 (4th Cir. 1983).
66. Id.
67. 724 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1983).
68. Id. at 1277.
69. 729 F.2d 1502, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
70. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
71. Id. at 18-19.
72. 592 F.2d 947, 960 (7th Cir. 1979).
73. Id.
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of statutory provisions designed to limit and moderate the impact of
the burdens to determine rationality. 74
The due process issue under MPPAA is whether or not its retroactive
provisions are rational, i.e. constitutional. While several district courts75
have summarily rejected these challenges, at least four circuits have
considered the problem at length.
The D.C. Circuit addressed the problem in Washington Star Co. 76
The issue here was whether the retroactive liability provisions of MPPAA
were rationally related to the end sought. The employer argued for
stringent application of the four-part Nachman test to -determine "ra-
tionality." However, the court instead applied a facial test of rationality,
relying primarily upon the Supreme Court's analysis in Usery.77 In
Usery, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court upheld a retroactive liability
provision in a federal coal mining statute, stating that
the imposition of liability for the effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified
as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those
who have profited from the fruits of their labors ... [The retroactive liability
provisions] allocate to the mine operator an actual, measurable cost of his business!8
The D.C. Circuit held that MPPAA's liability scheme was a rational
response to inadequacies in ERISA's multiemployer provisions, thereby
upholding the constitutionality of the plan.
Due process ... leaves Congress with considerable flexibility in determining how
to spread the cost of ensuring the retirement security of participants in multiemployer
plans. As the Supreme Court noted in [Usery], '[i]t is enough to say that the Act
approaches the problem of cost spreading rationally; whether a broader cost-
spreading scheme would have been wiser or more practical under the circumstances
is not a question of constitutional dimension." 9
The First Circuit initially found MPPAA procedures to be uncon-
stitutional; however, it reversed itself one year later. In Keith Fulton
& Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters and Trucking Industry Pension
Fund,0 the First Circuit struck down section 1401(a)(3), which estab-
lished the rebuttable presumption that the determination of the plan
sponsors was correct. The court struck down this section as a violation
of procedural due process. Recognizing that plan trustees owed a fi-
74. As set forth in Textile Workers Pension Fund, 725 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1984).
75. See e.g., Dorn's Transportation, Inc. v. I.A.M. National Pension Fund, Benefit
Plan A, 578 F. Supp. 1222 (D.D.C. 1984); Shelter Framing Corp. v. Carpenters Pension
Trust for Southern California, 543 F. Supp. 1234 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
76. 729 F.2d 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
77. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
78. Washington Star Co. v. International Typographical Union Negotiating Pension
Plan, 729 F.2d 1502, 1509-10 (D.C. Cir. 1984), citing Usery, 428 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1976).
79. Id. at 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
80. 762 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1984).
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duciary duty to the beneficiaries of the fund which might lead them
to collect as much as possible from the withdrawing employer,8 ' the
court further held that the double presumptions established by the Act
made these determinations virtually unchallengeable. In light of these
two serious handicaps facing withdrawing employers, the court found
that procedural due process was violated notwithstanding the fact that
Congress could have rationally provided for the use .of arbitrators in
statutory liability determinations.
8 2
On rehearing the First Circuit reversed its original decision. 83 The
court found that the judiciary's role was not to decide whether a fairer
method could have been established by Congress to determine liability
under the Act, but only "whether the method Congress chose is fair
enough. '84 While recognizing the hardship inflicted upon withdrawing
employers, the court discounted both the trustee bias and presumption
arguments.85
In addressing the trustee bias, the court rejected the suggestions that
the trustee would always choose the highest withdrawal liability without
becoming unreasonable or clearly erroneous. Citing a Congressional
Report,8 6 the First Circuit intimated that plan trustees would not set
excessively high withdrawal liabilities because they then would not be
meeting their fiduciary obligations to the fund.
The court also relied upon the same House Report in examining the
validity of the statutory presumptions. "These [presumptions] are nec-
essary in order to ensure the enforcability [sic] of employer liability.
In the absence of these presumptions, employers could effectively nullify
their obligations by refusing to pay and forcing the plan sponsor to
prove every element involved in making an actuarial determination."8
However, establishing these presumptions merely shifts the impossibility
of proving the unreasonableness of the actuarial determination from the
plan sponsors to the withdrawing employers. The court agreed with
81. The court likened the trustees' position to that of the town mayor in Ward v.
Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), in which the Supreme Court found that
allowing the mayor to act as an initial judge for certain minor violations, even if the
accused had a right to trial de novo in a higher court, was unconstitutional because the
accused had the right to a "neutral and detached judge in the first instance." 762 F.2d
1124, 1134 (citing 409 U.S. 57, 60-62 (1972)).
82. Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters and Trucking Industry
Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1124, 1133-35 (1st Cir. 1984).
83. Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters and Trucking Industry
Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1985).
84. Id. at 1140.
85. Id. at 1140-46.
86. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94
Stat. 1208 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2918, 2954.
87. Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters and Trucking Industry
Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1137, 1143 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 869, 96th
Cong. 2d Sess. 86, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2918, 2954.
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Congress that this burden, although too high for pension plan sponsors,
is nevertheless acceptable for withdrawing employers.
This reasoning highlights the fact that MPPAA is essentially a punitive
act. Congress, recognizing the need to avert financial disaster for PBGC,
imposed the burden of maintaining a financially stable fund upon those
withdrawing employers who might seek to avoid their responsibilities as
contributors to multiemployer pension plans.
In its consideration of the due process issue, the Second Circuit
employed the Nachman analysis in Textile Workers Pension Fund v.
Standard Dye and Finishing Co.,8" though it did so without expressly
determining whether Nachman or the traditional due process analysis
was the correct test. The court tested MPPAA's arbitration provisions
against the four factors defined in Nachman.8 9
The court was unpersuaded by the employers' contention that im-
position of retroactive MPPAA violated the first Nachman factor of
the parties' reliance interests. Rather, the court noted that ERISA
already contained provisions to extend mandatory PBGC coverage to
multiemployer plans in 1978. Moreover, at the time the challenging
employers withdrew from their plans, MPPAA passage was imminent.
By this date the employers had constructive notice of their potential
liability. The court, disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit,90 found that the
covered employees' reliance interest would be impaired absent MPPAA
liability. Although an individual employer's withdrawal would directly
impact only upon the pension fund which it had established, this
withdrawal would also force the remaining employers to assume the
financial responsibilities of the withdrawn employer. Consequently, these
employers would have an incentive to withdraw given their heightened
financial burden. Thus, many covered employees may be affected by
the withdrawal of one employer. In this manner, the reliance interest
of the covered employees would be impaired absent the imposition of
withdrawal liability. Thus, according to the court, the employees' interests
outweigh those of the withdrawing employer.
The court quickly disposed of the second Nachman factor, ruling
that since the adoption of ERISA in 1974, the area of pension fund
solvency had come under intense congressional scrutiny and had been
subject to pervasive regulation. Moreover, the equities weighed heavily
88. 725 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1984). See also Terson Co., Inc. v. Bakery Drivers
and Salesmen Local 194 (3d Cir. 1984).
89. See note 74 and accompanying text.
90. See Shelter Framing Corp., 705 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Carpenters Pension Trust for Southern California v. Shelter Framing Corp.,
467 U.S. 1257 (1984), and text infra. Shelter Framing Corp. was vacated in light of
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984), which rejected
due process challenges against the retroactive provisions of the Act. 467 U.S. 717, 728
n.7 (1984).
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in favor of the covered employees. Withdrawing employers were merely
being required to fulfill obligations they had assumed in the establishment
of the pension fund and covered employees were getting the benefits
of their bargain. Finally, the court found that MPPAA did contain
provisions which ameliorated the burden of imposing withdrawal liability
upon employers.9'
In Shelter Framing Corp. v. Carpenters Pension Trust,92 the Ninth
Circuit also applied Nachman, but reached a different result. Because
the court found that the employees' reliance interest was vested in the
solvency of the pension plan, rather than in the actions of the withdrawing
employer, it concluded that the first Nachman factor weighed in favor
of the employer. The Ninth Circuit did not engage in the type of
indirect analysis utilized by the Second Circuit in Textile Workers
Pension Fund. Unlike the Second Circuit, it refused to find that all
members of multiemployer pension funds had been put on constructive
notice as to potential withdrawal liability because of the imminent
coverage by PBGC of those plans in 1978.
However, in Board of Trustees of Western Conference of Teamsters
Pension Trust Fund v. Thompson Building Materials, Inc.,93 another
panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld section 1401, eschewing Nachman
in favor of the simple rationality analysis. In applying the simple
rationality test, the court relied upon Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.
v. R.A. Gray & Co., 94 which reversed, inter alia, Shelter Framing Corp.
Although R.A. Gray & Co. did not address the due process challenges
by employers who withdrew after MPPAA's effective date, it did provide
a basis for the Ninth Circuit to reject such employer challenges. The
respondent in R.A. Gray & Co. had argued that MPPAA violated due
process by imposing financial obligations which had neither been agreed
to nor contemplated by the collective bargaining agreement. Thompson
Building Materials' principal claim of unconstitutional contractual in-
fringement was therefore expressly rejected in R.A. Gray & Co. Relying
upon Usery, the court applied a rationality test, which was easily met.
Thus, the Supreme Court's analysis of the Act in R.A. Gray & Co.
coupled with the circuit courts' decisions on the due process issue suggest
a futility of future challenges. 95
91. Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye and Finishing Co., 725 F.2d 843,
851-52 (2d Cir. 1984).
92. 705 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded sub nom. Carpenters Pension
Trust for Southern California v. Shelter Framing Corp.., 467 U.S. 1257.
93. 749 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1984).
94. 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
95. It should be noted, however, that the First Circuit delineated a number of reasonable.
due process objections to section 1401 in Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England
Teamsters and Trucking Industry, 762 F.2d 1137 (1984), rev'd on rehearing, 762 F.2d
1137 (Ist Cir. 1985).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Section 1401 arbitration represents an extension of a traditional
dispute resolution technique into a non-traditional area. Although
MPPAA's use of dispute resolution in determining statutory liability is
unique, it has withstood numerous challenges. Needless to say, the
success of MPPAA arbitration provides both a foundation and a beacon
for the expanded use of dispute resolution in the federal statutory
scheme.
John Francis Raposa
